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INTRODUCTION

In the past few years, advances in big data, machine learning,1 and
intellectual property field.2 One question that has attracted growing attention
concerns whether algorithms3 can be better deployed to promote fair use in
copyright law. The debate on the feasibility of developing automated fair use
systems is not new; it can be traced back to more than a decade ago.4
Nevertheless, recent technological advances have invited policymakers and
commentators to revisit this earlier debate.
As

1 See generally David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653 (2017) (providing an accessible overview of
machine learning for lawyers).
2 An obvious question in the copyright area concerns whether creative works generated by
intelligent machines are eligible for copyright protection. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Coding
Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5 (2012);
Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 395 (2016);
Daniel J. Gervais, The Machine as Author, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Jane C. Ginsburg &
Luke Ali Budiardjo, Authors and Machines, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 343 (2019); James Grimmelmann,
There s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work And It s a Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 403 (2016) [hereinafter Grimmelmann, There s No Such Thing]; Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation &
Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52 AKRON L. REV. 813, 836 47 (2018); Carys J. Craig & Ian
R. Kerr, The Death of the AI Author (Osgoode Hall Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3374951. For a provocative discussion of the role of robots in copyright s
cosmology, see generally James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657
(2016). For earlier discussions of copyright issues involving computer-generated works, see generally
Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True
Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675 (1997); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106
HARV. L. REV. 977, 1042 72 (1993); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in ComputerGenerated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986).
3 As the U.S. Public Policy Council of the Association for Computing Machinery explained:
An algorithm is a self-contained step-by-step set of operations that computers and other smart
devices carry out to perform calculation, data processing, and automated reasoning tasks.
Increasingly, algorithms implement institutional decision-making based on analytics, which
involves the discovery, interpretation, and communication of meaningful patterns in data. Especially
valuable in areas rich with recorded information, analytics relies on the simultaneous application of
statistics, computer programming, and operations research to quantify performance.

U.S. ASS N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY: STATEMENT ON ALGORITHMIC TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
1
(Jan.
12,
2017),
https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/publicpolicy/2017_usacm_statement_algorithms.pdf [hereinafter ACM Statement].
4 For earlier discussions in this area, see generally Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights
Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49 (2006); Dan L. Burk & Julie E.
Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 53 (2001);
Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U.L. REV. 13, 63 73 (2006).
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whether algorithms can be better deployed to promote fair use in copyright
law. Part II explains why policymakers and commentators have remained
skeptical about such deployment. Part III builds the case for greater
algorithmic deployment to promote fair use. Part IV concludes by identifying
areas to which policymakers and commentators should pay greater attention
if automated fair use systems are to be developed. Although this Article
draws heavily on U.S. copyright law due in part to the location of this
symposium and in part to the active transplant of the U.S. fair use model
abroad5
le to all jurisdictions that
have embraced fair use, fair dealing, or hybrid models.6
II.

SKEPTICISM TOWARD AUTOMATION

Thus far, policymakers and commentators have advanced three major
arguments explaining why algorithms cannot be satisfactorily deployed to
promote fair use in copyright law. This Part outlines each argument in turn.
A.

Backward State of Technology

The first major argument against the satisfactory deployment of
algorithms to promote fair use concerns our relatively backward state of
use is one of the starkest examples of the mismatch between what the law
requires and what technology can do. Accurate, technological enforcement
of the law of fair use is far beyond t

5 See Peter K. Yu, Fair Use and Its Global Paradigm Evolution, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 111, 129
37 (2019) [hereinafter Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution] (documenting a growing trend toward the
worldwide adoption of the U.S. fair use model and a slowly emerging paradigm shift in international
copyright norms); see also Peter K. Yu, Customizing Fair Use Transplants, 7 LAWS 1, 3 10 (2018)
(discussing the efforts to transplant fair use across the world and the eight different modalities of
transplantation that the transplanting jurisdictions have employed). See generally JONATHAN BAND &
JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333863
(listing the fair use or fair dealing provisions from around the world).
6

I noted earlier the distinction between fair use and fair dealing as follows:
Like fair use, . . . fair dealing allows for an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work. Unlike fair use,
however, it promotes a closed system of copyright limitations and exceptions. Each fair dealing
provision is drafted with a specific purpose, or a set of related purposes. Unless the user s conduct
falls within a specified purpose, the use will not be permissible under copyright law.
Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution, supra note 5, at 126; see also Peter K. Yu, The Quest for a User-Friendly
Copyright Regime in Hong Kong, 32 AM. U. INT L L. REV. 283, 327 (2016) ( [A] better way to distinguish
between fair dealing and fair use is to describe the former as a closed-ended, purpose-based regime and
the latter as an open-ended, flexible regime. ).
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7

Because the current state of technology does not allow us
8
it is very difficult, if not impossible, to
satisfactorily deploy algorithms to make automated fair use determinations
on a case-by-case basis.
A key part of this technological challenge involves the significant
difference between the approaches taken by judges to determine whether
copyright law permits a specific use of a copyrighted work and those taken
by computer programmers. Under the current copyright system, courts
refrain from making ex ante determinations on what uses would be
considered fair.9 I
conflicts arise and the cases go to courts, judges will make determinations
after the fact.10 By contrast, computer programmers need to know in advance
what legal rules and outcomes should be built into automated systems. While
they will try their best to translate those rules and outcomes into code and
algorithms, they will have considerable difficulty determining ex ante how
judges will rule in new situations.11 Inevitably, such translation will also
7 Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 57, 59;
see also JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 192 (2019) ( Automated processes have obvious efficiency advantages, but
such processes may not align well (or at all) with applicable legal requirements that are couched in shades
of gray. ); Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 56 ( At least for now, there is no feasible way to build rights
management code that approximates both the individual results of judicial determinations and the overall
dynamism of fair use jurisprudence. ); Ian R. Kerr et al., Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at
Copyright s Windmill, 34 OTTAWA L. REV. 7, 31 (2002) ( [T]he technologies employed by [digital rights
management systems] are not yet sufficiently sophisticated to mirror the law of copyright because
[technological protection measures] themselves remain incapable of distinguishing between infringing
and non-infringing uses of digital works. ); Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J.
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 110 11 (2007) ( Image-parsing software may someday be able to
identify pictures or videos that are similar to individual copyrighted works, but they will never be able to
determine whether those pictures are fair uses, or whether they are legitimate copies or displays made
under one of the many statutory exceptions . . . ).
8 See Felten, supra note 7, at 58 ( A [digital rights management system] that gets all fair use
judgments right would in effect be a judge on a chip predicting with high accuracy how a real judge
would decide a lawsuit challenging a particular use. Clearly, this is infeasible with today s technology. );
see also Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 59 ( At present, only human intelligence, reviewing the unique
circumstances of a particular use, can determine whether it is likely to be fair. ).
9 See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 288 (2019) ( [F]air use carries
with it the disadvantage of ex ante uncertainty; no one can be entirely certain in advance how a court will
weigh the four factors, and hence there is always some apprehension that a use may be found infringing
rather than fair. ); Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 61 ( Under the current conception of fair use, the
decision whether or not to use a work is made ex ante by the user if an infringement suit is brought later,
the court may or may not validate the user s calculus, but penalties, if any, are imposed after the use has
been undertaken. ).
10 See John S. Erickson & Deirdre K. Mulligan, The Technical and Legal Dangers of Code-Based
Fair Use Enforcement, 92 PROC. IEEE 985, 992 (2004) ( In the area of copyright law, the evolution of
the doctrine of fair use is tightly bound to the practice of after-the-fact adjudication. ).
11 As Dan Burk and Julie Cohen observed:
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understanding and interpretation of the law.12
To be sure, the past decade has seen significant advances in big data,
machine learning, and artificial intelligence. One may recall media reports
about how IBM Watson prevailed over noted human champions in the quiz
show Jeopardy!13
14
As amazing
as these technological advances have been, they do not automatically
translate into automated fair use determinations. Just because Watson has
performed well in Jeopardy! does not mean that it can perform equally well
as a fair use judge. While transferred learning has become increasingly
popular,15
16
there is no evidence
that Watson or AlphaGo can successfully transfer its learning from Jeopardy!
or Go to intellectual property law.17
We are not optimistic that system designers will be able to anticipate the range of access privileges
that may be appropriate for fair uses to be made of a particular work. Neither are we optimistic that
system designers will be able to anticipate the types of uses that would be considered fair by a court.
Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 55.
12 See Lisa A. Shay et al., Confronting Automated Law Enforcement, in ROBOT LAW 235, 257
(Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016) ( [T]hose who specify and implement the code base of a system will likely
make their own interpretations of legal and illegal behavior, perhaps without any legal training. ); Maayan
Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA.
L. REV. 181, 189 (2017) ( [T]ranslating legal mandates into code inevitably embodies particular choices
as to how the law is interpreted, which may be affected by a variety of extrajudicial considerations,
including the conscious and unconscious professional assumptions of program developers, as well as
various private business incentives. ). See generally Lisa A. Shay et al., Do Robots Dream of Electric
Laws? An Experiment in the Law as Algorithm, in ROBOT LAW, supra, at 274 (providing an interesting
study documenting the variances in an empirical experiment in which three teams of computer
programmers were asked to translate a subset of the New York State traffic law into computer code for
the purposes of determining traffic violations based on real-world driving data).
13 John Markoff, Computer Wins on Jeopardy! : Trivial, It s Not, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at
A1.
14 See Choe Sang-Hun & John Markoff, Machine Masters Man in Complex Game of Go, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2016, at A1 (reporting AlphaGo s victory over eighteen-time world Go champion Lee
Sedol); Paul Mozur, In Win for A.I., Google Program Humbles Master of a Mind-Boggling Game, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 2017, at B3 (reporting AlphaGo s victory over Ke Jie, the world s then best Go player).
15 For overviews of transfer learning in the deep learning context, see generally JOHN D.
KELLEHER, DEEP LEARNING 236 37 (2019); Jason Brownlee, A Gentle Introduction to Transfer Learning
for
Deep
Learning,
MACHINE
LEARNING
MASTERY
(Dec.
20,
2017),
https://machinelearningmastery.com/transfer-learning-for-deep-learning/.
16 KELLEHER, supra note 15, at 236.
17 See Woodrow Barfield, Towards a Law of Artificial Intelligence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 2, 9 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) ( [W]hile
impressive examples of skilled behavior, [IBM, AlphaGo, and other similar victories] are examples of
artificial intelligence performing in a narrow domain of expertise; at this time more human-like artificial
intelligence remains elusive. ). Healthcare is one area in which Watson has not been very successful,
THE
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Changes in Creative Choices and Practices

The second major argument against the satisfactory deployment of
algorithms to promote fair use relates to behavioral changes such deployment
will generate. In a recent article, Dan Burk expressed fear that algorithmic
fair use would create considerable biases, which in turn would affect
authorial choices.18
automated systems become embedded in public behavior and consciousness.
Thus, algorithmic fair use carries with it the very real possibility of
habituating new media participants to its own biases and so progressively
19

. After all, we have
already seen significant behavioral changes following the active deployment
of algorithms in technology platforms to facilitate copyright enforcement, 20
II.B will
further discuss).21 To avoid automatic detection, users have changed the type
of content they upload to these platforms.22 Outside the intellectual property
context, we have seen Facebook users modifying behavior to manipulate or
23
By including hashtags, metadata, or
despite IBM s high ambition. See ERIC J. TOPOL, DEEP MEDICINE: HOW ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CAN
MAKE HEALTHCARE HUMAN AGAIN 55 (2019) ( IBM Watson s experience with MD Anderson, one of
the country s leading cancer centers, was a debacle noteworthy for many missteps. ); Steve Lohr,
Fulfilling Watson s Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2016, at B1 (noting Watson s failure to perform well
in the healthcare area).
18 Burk, supra note 9.
19

Id. at 285.
For discussions of algorithmic copyright enforcement, see generally Maayan Perel & Niva
Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016)
[hereinafter Perel & Elkin-Koren, Accountability]; Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 12.
21 See
How
Content
ID
Works,
YOUTUBE
HELP,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Dec. 20, 2019) (providing an
20

& Elkin-Koren, Accountability, supra note 20, at 509 16; Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the
Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 543 60 (2017).
22 See Tony Zhou, Postmortem: Every Frame a Painting, MEDIUM (Dec. 3, 2017),
https://medium.com/@tonyszhou/postmortem-1b338537fabc, quoted in Burk, supra note 9, at 303
and[they] chose, the way narration and clip audio weave together, the reordering and flipping of shots, the
23 See Caleb Garling,
, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/tricking-facebooks-algorithm/375801/
(discussing the experience of tricking Facebook to elevate the author s post); Anjana Susarla, The New
Digital Divide Is Between People Who Opt Out of Algorithms and People Who Don t, THE
CONVERSATION (Apr. 17, 2019), https://theconversation.com/the-new-digital-divide-is-between-peoplewho-opt-out-of-algorithms-and-people-who-dont-114719 ( A study of Facebook usage found that when

2020]

Can Algorithms Promote Fair Use?

335

typos, Internet and social media users have also redesigned their expressions
to enhance or evade algorithm-driven recognition.24 As if these examples
were not enough, an entire industry has been created to help businesses and
25
Thus, if algorithms are deployed to a
greater extent to make automated fair use determinations, it will be no
surprise to find authors altering their creative choices and practices.
C.

Technological Shortcomings

The final major argument against the satisfactory deployment of
algorithms to promote fair use pertains to the biases, bugs, and other
documented problems now found in automated systems.26 For instance,
ProPublica published an exposé on the racial biases found in COMPAS, the
scoring software used by law enforcement and correction personnel to
determine risks of recidivism.27

participants were made aware of Facebook s algorithm for curating news feeds, about 83% of participants
modified their behavior to try to take advantage of the algorithm, while around 10% decreased their usage
of Facebook. ); see also Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1,
12 14 (2018) (listing avoidance, altered conduct, altered input, and obfuscation among the dominant
gaming strategies deployed by users on Internet platforms).
24 As Tarleton Gillespie observed:
When we use hashtags in our tweets a user innovation that was embraced later by Twitter we are
not just joining a conversation or hoping to be read by others, we are redesigning our expression so
noticed by the algorithm: teens have been known to tag their status updates with unrelated brand
work to evade an algorithm: Napster and P2P users sharing infringing copyrighted music were
record industry software would not.
Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON
COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167, 184 (Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., 2014) (footnote
omitted); see also Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automation in Moderation, 52 CORNELL INT L L.J.
(forthcoming 2020) (noting the research from the University of Washington that shows how platform
users have s
-driven anti-trolling system by using misspellings such as
.
25 See Bambauer & Zarsky, supra note 23
for the
searc
26 See ANDREW MCAFEE & ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, MACHINE, PLATFORM, CROWD: HARNESSING
OUR DIGITAL FUTURE
Burk, supra note
9
potential pitfalls in reliance on algorithmic regulation); Peter K. Yu, The Algorithmic Divide and Equality
in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 72 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing algorithmic biases).
27 Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May
23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm.
Id.
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defendants were far more likely than white defendants to be incorrectly
judged to be at a higher risk of recidivism, while white defendants were more
28
In
Tay had quickly become sexist and racis

. . had [the
29

Another report showed that Hewletton [its] new . . . computers did not track the faces of Black people in some
30

While many of these problems were the result of improperly designed
algorithms, properly designed algorithms will face similar problems if they
fail to obtain appropriate training data. In computer science jargon, such
that is, the computer
will produce faulty outcomes when the inputted data were inaccurate, biased,
or otherwise inappropriate.31 In the copyright context, for example,
algorithms that are trained on data involving parodied entertainment will
likely provide very different outcomes from those that are trained on data
involving textbooks and other educational materials. How well automated
fair use systems perform will therefore depend on how well the input data
correspond to court decisions and day-to-day fair use practices.
More problematic, because algorithmic outcomes are often fed back into
the algorithms as training data, the utilization of machine learning will create
self-reinforced feedback loops that amplify the biases found in the initial

28
29

Id.

Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, Code-Dependent: Pros and Cons of the Algorithm Age 13, PEW
RES. CTR. (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/02/08/code-dependent-pros-and-cons-of-thealgorithm-age.
30 Christian Sandvig et al., When the Algorithm Itself Is a Racist: Diagnosing Ethical Harm in the
Basic Components of Software, 10 INT L J. COMM. 4972, 4973 (2016) (citations omitted).
31 See Yu, Global Paradigm Evolution, supra note 5, at 157 (defining garbage in, garbage out
situation as one in which incorrect input ends up producing faulty output ). This age-old problem can be
traced back to the early days of computing. See Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix
Artificial Intelligence s Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 585 n.25 (2018) (noting that
Charles Babbage, whom many refer to as the father of computer, was asked whether the right answers
would have come out if the wrong figures had been put into the machine (citing CHARLES BABBAGE,
PASSAGES FROM THE LIFE OF A PHILOSOPHER 67 (1864))).
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algorithms or training data.32 Until these biases are corrected by human
intervention, perhaps33 the initial biases will be greatly magnified.34
As if the algorithmic biases were not disturbing enough, these biases are
not easily observable because they are locked inside what commentators have
35

[in these black boxes] are mysterious; we can observe [their] inputs and

32

As Ronald Yu and Gabriele Spina Alì observed:

[T]here is a strong risk that AI may reiterate and even amplify the biases and flaws in datasets, even
when these are unknown to humans. In this sense, AI has a self-reinforcing nature, due to the fact
that the machine s outputs will be used as data for future algorithmic operations.
Ronald Yu & Gabriele Spina Alì, What s Inside the Black Box? AI Challenges for Lawyers and
Researchers, 19 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 2, 4 (2019); see also Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges in the
Age of Big Data, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803, 827 (2017) (noting that
algorithmic self-reinforcing loops are now present across many spheres of our daily life (e.g., retail
contexts, career contexts, credit decisions, insurance, Google search results, news feeds) ); Sonia K.
Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 69 (2019) ( Bad
data . . . can perpetuate inequalities through machine learning, leading to a feedback loop that replicates
existing forms of bias, potentially impacting minorities as a result. ); Digital Decisions 8, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Digital-DecisionsLibrary-Printer-Friendly-as-of-20180927.pdf ( Unreliable or unfair decisions that go unchallenged can
contribute to bad feedback loops, which can make algorithms even more likely to marginalize vulnerable
populations. ).
33 Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett, for example, noted the continuous role of humans in
algorithmic development:
Algorithmic decision-making does not mean that humans are shut out of the process. Even after the
objective has been set, there is much human work to be done. Indeed, humans are involved in all
stages of setting up, training, coding, and assessing the merits of the algorithm. If the objectives of
the algorithm and the objective of the law are perfectly aligned at the ex ante stage, one must ask:
Under what circumstances should a human ignore the algorithm s suggestions and intervene after
the algorithm has made the decision?
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personalization of Law, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 333, 354 (2019); see also Council Regulation 2016/679 art. 22(3), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (requiring a
data controller to implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject s rights and freedoms and
legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express
his or her point of view and to contest [a decision based solely on automated processing, including
profiling] ); Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing
whether individuals have a right to a human decision ); Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the
Loop: Political Constructions of Computer Automation and Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 216 (2017)
(tracing the historical roots of the right to a human in the loop back to rights that protect the dignity of
data subjects).
34 See Yu, supra note 26 ( As time passes, the biases generated through these loops will become
much worse than the biases found in the original algorithmic designs or the initial training data. ).
35 For book-length treatments of the problems generated by black box algorithms, see generally
VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH
THE POOR (2017); CATHY O NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE
SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
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Worse still, these

disadvantaged by factors such as race, gender and socio-economic
37

affect users more than copyright holders or technology platforms, as the two
latter groups will have more political clout and will therefore be in better
positions to build their preferences into those black boxes, or the processes
used to design them.38
In sum, there are many arguments against the satisfactory deployment
of algorithms to promote fair use in copyright law. If such algorithms are to
be deployed to a greater extent, policymakers will need to address most, or
all, of these concerns.
III.

THE CASE FOR AUTOMATION

Although policymakers and commentators have remained skeptical
about the feasibility of developing automated systems to promote fair use in
copyright law, several major arguments exist to support greater algorithmic
deployment. This Part outlines each argument in turn.
36 PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 3; see also EUBANKS, supra note 35, at 5 ( [T]hat s the thing about
being targeted by an algorithm: you get a sense of a pattern in the digital noise, an electronic eye turned
toward you, but you can t put your finger on exactly what s amiss. ); Rainie & Anderson, supra note 29,
at 19 There is a larger problem with the increase of algorithm-based outcomes beyond the risk of error
or discrimination the increasing opacity of decision-making and the growing lack of human
accountability. (quoting Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center)).
37 Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research, NATURE (Oct. 13, 2016),
https://www.nature.com/news/there-is-a-blind-spot-in-ai-research-1.20805. As Cathy O Neil observed:
[Algorithm-driven weapons of math destruction] tend to punish the poor. This is, in part, because
they are engineered to evaluate large numbers of people. They specialize in bulk, and they re cheap.
That s part of their appeal. The wealthy, by contrast, often benefit from personal input. A white-shoe
law firm or an exclusive prep school will lean far more on recommendations and face-to-face
interviews than will a fast-food chain or a cash-strapped urban school district. The privileged, we ll
see time and again, are processed more by people, the masses by machines.
O NEIL, supra note 35, at 8; see also EUBANKS, supra note 35, at 12 (lamenting how [a]utomated
decision-making shatters the social safety net, criminalizes the poor, intensifies discrimination, and
compromises our deepest national values ); Rainie & Anderson, supra note 29, at 63 65 (surveying views
on whether the disadvantaged will lag behind even further in this algorithmic age).
38 See COHEN, supra note 7, at 193 ( Industry standard-making processes . . . are lengthy,
secretive, and notoriously resistant to public interest oversight. ); Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 616 (2003) ( [N]ot all standards processes include end user representation,
and even in those that do, there is no assurance that end user grievances, once aired, will prospectively
shape the standards that are brought to market. ). See generally MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT
MASQUERADE: HOW CORPORATE LOBBYING THREATENS ONLINE FREEDOMS (2013) (discussing how
legislative capture by the copyright industries has undermined online freedom); BRINK LINDSEY &
STEVEN TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN
GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY 64 89 (2017) (discussing capture in the intellectual property area).
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Gradual Deployment

The first major argument supporting greater algorithmic deployment to
promote fair use concerns the need to take incremental steps if automated fair
use systems are to be developed. Just because the current state of technology
does not support perfect automated fair use determinations does not mean
that we should not try to deploy algorithms to a more limited extent. As
Microsoft software architects Barbara Fox and Brian LaMacchia declared in
the early 2000s:
[The limitation that no one can mathematically model fair
use, as it is understood today,] should not stop us from
attempting to identify a useful subset we might approximate
in code. That is, we can take a purely pragmatic engineering
approach. . . . Focus first on defining and modeling a useful
subset of fair use rights in some policy language, then add
these expressions to the policy evaluators of [digital rights
management] systems.39
More recently, Niva Elkinintends to create on the rights of authors must . . . be embedded in the design
40

In an article written for the Inaugural Summit on Intellectual Property
and Digital Media organized by The Cable Center and the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law in May 2006, I also noted the need to
distinguish between limitations and exceptions that can be interpreted by
machines from those that cannot.41 As I explained at that time:
39 Barbara L. Fox & Brian A. LaMacchia, Encouraging Recognition of Fair Uses in DRM Systems,
COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 61, 63. Matthew Sag concurred:
The difficulty of completely automating fair use analysis does not suggest . . . that algorithms have
no role to play. Experience, common sense, and recent empirical research suggest that there are some
objective characteristics that make a finding of fair use more likely, and there is no reason in
principle why matching algorithms could not be fine-tuned to identify common situations associated
with a higher probability of fair use.
Sag, supra note 21, at 531 32. Likewise, Timothy Armstrong observed:
The flaw in the conclusion that [digital rights management] cannot accommodate fair use is an
unduly hasty inductive leap from the specific (the impossibility of modeling the substance of fair
use law in machine-administrable form) to the general (the supposed impossibility of protecting fair
use at all in [digital rights management] systems). The foreclosure of one avenue for protecting fair
use, however, does not imply that all avenues are likewise foreclosed, but only that design principles
other than the creation of a perfect judge on a chip must be explored.
Armstrong, supra note 4, at 88.
40 Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1085 (2017).
41 See Yu, supra note 4, at 63 73 (discussing the need for such a distinction); see also Deirdre
Mulligan & Aaron Burstein, Implementing Copyright Limitations in Rights Expression Languages, in
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The fact that the scope and boundaries of [fair use] are
uncertain and that software code at the current state of
technology may not be able to capture the full range of
exceptions and limitations in the copyright system does not
mean that we should not build legitimate uses into the
[digital rights management] systems.42
Drawing on research in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights, to
which intellectual property rights belong,43 I suggested that automated fair
minimum essential
before the coverage is expanded to take
advantage of technological improvements and increased technical
resources.44
B.

Extant Deployment

The second argument supporting greater algorithmic deployment to
promote fair use relates to the fact that such deployment has already taken
place in the area of copyright enforcement.45 Whether we like it or not,
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, DRM 2002,
WASHINGTON, DC, USA, NOVEMBER 18, 2002: REVISED PAPERS 137 (Joan Feigenbaum ed., 2002)
(discussing ways and challenges to implementing copyright limitations and exceptions in rights expression
languages, with a focus on XrML, the eXtensible Rights Markup Language); Fox & LaMacchia, supra
note 39, at 63 (considering the importance of determining how to create machine-interpretable
expressions that adequately model a set (or subset) of fair use rights ).
42 Yu, supra note 4, at 63.
43 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(c), Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (requiring each state party to the Covenant to recognize the right of everyone . . .
[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary
or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author. ); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material
Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author
(Article 15, Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) (providing an
authoritative interpretation of Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights).
44 Yu, supra note 4, at 65 66. As I elaborated:
Under this proposal, software code would be used to accommodate machine-interpretable
noninfringing uses, while the determination of the machine-uninterpretable noninfringing uses
would remain in the province of courts. As technology advanced and computer programming
became more sophisticated, [digital rights management] systems would be able to accommodate
more noninfringing uses. The domain of machine-interpretable noninfringing uses would therefore
expand, leaving fewer and fewer copyright matters to courts.
Id. at 65.
45 As Professor Sag observed:
[D]espite the lack of a de jure obligation to filter under the DMCA [Digital Millennium Copyright
Act], many platforms typically large-scale commercial enterprises are nonetheless implementing
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copyright holders will continue to expand such deployment, due in large part
to the efficiency and effectiveness provided by automation. A case in point
is Y
on to the platform every day,46 it is virtually impossible for this streaming
platform to manually review each uploaded video file.
Thus far, the Content ID system deployed by YouTube has been the
most widely cited example of automated copyright enforcement.47 Using
hashes or digital fingerprints, this system compares files uploaded by Internet
users with the reference files provided by copyright holders.48 If the files
match, copyright h
49

When musical works or sound recordings
are involved, the right holders can also mute the video. Although the
enforcement provided by the Content ID system has been both underinclusive
and overinclusive,50 the copyright industries and their supportive
automated copyright enforcement systems. At the present time, platforms using automated copyright
enforcement include Scribid, 4shared, Dropbox, YouTube, Facebook, SoundCloud, Twitch,
TuneCore, Tumblr, Veoh, and Vimeo. The pressure to adopt automated filtering comes primarily
from rightsholders, but these systems also meet some of the business objectives of platforms.
Sag, supra note 21, at 538 39; see also NICOLAS P. SUZOR, LAWLESS: THE SECRET RULES THAT GOVERN
OUR DIGITAL LIVES 72 (2019) ( Automated copyright detection systems have now been built into many
other services on the Internet. Facebook has developed its own detection systems, and companies like
Audible Magic produce software that has been adopted by many platforms. ); Burk, supra note 9, at 284
( In the area of copyright, protection of digitized works is already increasingly mediated by algorithmic
enforcement systems that are intended to effectuate the rights of copyright owners while simultaneously
limiting the liability of content intermediaries. ); Joe Karaganis & Jennifer Urban, The Rise of the Robo
Notice, COMM. ACM, Sept. 2015, at 28 (expressing concern about the growing use of robo notices to take
down potentially infringing copyrighted materials).
46 See Sag, supra note 21, at 539 ( Collectively, YouTube users now upload more than half a
million hours of video and watch hundreds of millions of hours of video every day. ).
47 See How Content ID Works, supra note 21.
48 As Professor Sag explained:
Content ID begins by taking reference files submitted by a person claiming to represent the copyright
owner and converting such files into a hash file or a digital fingerprint. In computer science, a hash
function is used to map information of indeterminate size to a long string of letters and digits of fixed
size. A perfect hash function will generate a unique hash for each unique input. The 128-bit hash
for the previous paragraph is ObllcO463b44082968blf3eedffbOf80, the hash for the same text with
the word Banana substituted for DMCA is 2863eb5ee4acdb9dO37ea9541ce16b62. Neither text
can be reverse engineered from their hash values, but once the texts are encoded as hash values it is
trivial to compare them to see if one is a match for the other. Using hash values to match audio and
visual content encoded in differing file formats is no trivial task, but the concepts are similar. Using
these hash values, new user content is automatically compared to the reference file as it is uploaded
to the site. The system can match audio and/or video; it can detect partial and degraded quality
matches as well as perfect high quality copies.
Sag, supra note 21, at 545 (footnote omitted).
49
50

How Content ID Works, supra note 21.
As Nicolas Suzor observed:
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policymakers and commentators have slowly embraced it and other similar
monitoring and filtering tools. In Europe, for instance, the recently adopted
EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market imposes copyright
liability on Internet service providers should they fail to put in place filtering
technology that would protect the copyrighted content disseminated online.51
C.

Technological Improvements

The third major argument supporting greater algorithmic deployment to
promote fair use pertains to the new technological advances relating to big
data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. Although the Content ID
system has provided a paradigmatic example of automated copyright
enforcement, it has yet to realize the full potential generated by these new
advances. With the incorporation of big data analytics and machine learning
capabilities and the development of learning algorithms, or so-called
52
automated fair use systems will not only function more

Of course, not everybody is happy with Content ID. The system provides no reliable way to resolve
disputes about fair use, which upsets both copyright owners and video creators. In modern
equivalents to Stephanie Lenz s dancing baby case, the YouTube algorithm will automatically flag
music and other copyrighted material that is caught in the background of a video. It will also
automatically catch content used in a critique or parody. YouTube s Content ID system cannot tell
the difference between someone who copies a few minutes of, say, a professional sporting event to
make fun of it and someone who shares parts of a match in a way that might deprive the distributors
of revenue. In these cases, YouTube creators have to go through a process to try to convince the
copyright owner that their use is fair. Ultimately, the copyright owner makes the decision: if they
reject the user s claim, they are redirected through the DMCA process to lodge a formal takedown
request. At this point, unless the YouTube user files a counter-notice, they ll get a strike against
their account. If a user gets three strikes in ninety days, Google will terminate their account.
SUZOR, supra note 45, at 72.
51 Article 17(4)(b) of the Directive provides:
If no authorisation [from the rightholders] is granted, online content-sharing service providers shall
be liable for unauthorised acts of communication to the public, including making available to the
public, of copyright-protected works and other subject matter, unless the service providers
demonstrate that they have . . . made, in accordance with high industry standards of professional
diligence, best efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works and other subject matter for
which the rightholders have provided the service providers with the relevant and necessary
information . . . .
Directive 2019/790 art. 17(4)(b), 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92. See generally Martin Senftleben, Bermuda
Triangle: Licensing, Filtering and Privileging User-Generated Content Under the New Directive on
Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 480, 482 85 (2019) (highlighting
the challenges posed by the new filtering obligation under the EU Directive).
52 See PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE
LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 6 (2015) ( Learning algorithms also known as
learners are algorithms that make other algorithms. With machine learning, computers write their own
programs, so we don t have to. ).
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efficiently and effectively, but their decisions will also bear stronger
resemblances to those made by real-life judges.53
Moreover, evidence has already emerged to show that intelligent
machines can perform select tasks better than humans. For instance,
researchers have documented the advantage of using learning algorithms to
diagnose cancer and to perform other tasks in the health area.54
55

In addition, the performance of
intelligent machines will not be affected by emotion, exhaustion, stress, or
other cognitive barriers.56 These machines can also be tested and therefore
53

As Niva Elkin-Koren reminded us:

Overall, th[e] concerns regarding the limitations of algorithmic fair use overlook recent
developments in Artificial Intelligence . . . and machine learning capabilities. AI has already been
applied in very sophisticated contexts: physicians use algorithms to guide their diagnoses; banks use
them to decide when to approve a loan; security agencies use AI to identify risks; lawyers use them
to perform due diligence; and even courts rely on algorithms for sentencing, by scoring the risk of
the offender committing future crimes. AI has already been applied for decision-making processes
in contexts that are far more complex than fair use, involving critical issues of life and death, health,
financial risks, and national security.
Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1096 97.
54 As Jonathan Guo and Li Bin observed:
Esteva et al. trained deep convolutional neural networks (CNN) based on a dataset of 129,450
clinical images to diagnose skin cancer. The results demonstrated that this system is able to classify
skin cancer at a comparable level to dermatologists. . . . Liu from Google, Inc. reported a CNN
framework to aid the pathological diagnosis of breast cancer metastasis in lymph nodes. The results
showed that this system could improve the speed, accuracy, and consistency of diagnosis, as well as
reduce the false negative rate to a quarter of the rate experienced by human pathologists.
Jonathan Guo & Li Bin,
Developing Countries, 2 HEALTH EQUITY 174, 175 (2018); see also TOPOL, supra note 17, at 117 18
(discussing the impressive progress in algorithmic image processing).
55 Digital Decisions, supra note 32, at 4.
56 See Karni Chagal-Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL Y 111,
144 ( Unlike humans, algorithms do not have self-interests affecting their judgement, they do not omit
any of the decision-making stages or base their decisions on heuristics or biases, and they are not subject
to human physical or emotional limitations such as exhaustion, stress or emotionality. (footnotes
omitted)); Rebecca Crootof, Cyborg Justice and the Risk of Technological Legal Lock-in, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. F. 233, 236 (2019) (noting that a judge s sensitivity to context and penchant for leniency may
vary dramatically with whether they are hungry, tired, bored, overworked, overwhelmed, or otherwise
distracted ); Lim, supra note 2, at 834 ( AI does not suffer from perceptual limitations the way that
humans do. ); Ozkan Eren & Naci Mocan, Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles (Nat l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22,611), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22611.pdf (documenting the
surprising impact of unexpected outcomes of football games on the type and length of sentences handed
down by juvenile court judges); Kurt Kleiner, Lunchtime Leniency: Judges Rulings Are Harsher When
They Are Hungrier, SCI. AM. (Sept. 1, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lunchtimeleniency/ ( Judges granted 65 percent of requests they heard at the beginning of the day s session and
almost none at the end. Right after a snack break, approvals jumped back to 65 percent again. (citing a
study at Ben Gurion University in Israel and Columbia University examining more than 1000 decisions
by eight Israeli judges who ruled on convicts parole requests)).
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improved.57
58

In fact, as
Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson remin
humans to acknowledge their biases (how many avowed racists or sexists do
59

When the advantages of automation are extrapolated to the fair use
context, these advantages suggest that automated fair use systems may
analyze certain fair use factors better than human judges.60 For illustrative
purposes, consider the analysis of the third factor in the U.S. fair use
tiality of the portion used
61
With respect to quantitative
analysis,62 it is not difficult to see how computers could provide quicker and
more accurate analysis.63 In fact, any judge seeking to undertake a quick
quantitative analysis will likely rely on computer assistance to count words
or compare sizes.

57 See MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 26, at 53 ( [M]achine-based systems typically can
be tested and improved. ).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60

Dan Burk expressed continuous skepticism toward automated fair use determinations:
It is perhaps not too farfetched to imagine a programmable exception of the fair dealing laundry list
sort although even for supposedly discrete statutory exceptions, concepts like educational use or
news reporting might be unexpectedly tricky to reduce to computable code. But one can, for
example, imagine programming a system to determine, perhaps on the basis of geolocational data
and scraped calendaring or advertising data, whether a nondramatic musical work is being performed
at an agricultural fair. It is far more difficult to envision how one might program a system to
determine whether a given use has a relevant degree of impact on the actual or potential market for
the work being used or whether an excerpt from the work is so significant as to constitute the heart
of an author s creation.
Burk, supra note 9, at 292 (footnotes omitted).
61 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
62 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 583 n.6 (1985) ( The
inquiry into the substantiality of appropriation has a quantitative . . . aspect. ); see also Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (noting the need to examine the quantity . . . of the
materials used ).
63 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1096 ( Some fair use considerations might be relatively easy
to automate, such as the amount copied from the original work. For instance, a program could give a
higher fair use score based on similarity of less than 10 percent. ).
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With respect to qualitative analysis,64 however, the lack of emotion and
empathy in machines65 may suggest their limited ability to determine66 what
67
On its face, this suggestion
68
is valid. Making value judgment is not the forte of automated systems. In
reality, however, there already exists a large trove of data concerning which
pages or sentences of a book Kindle users have highlighted the most.69
Netflix also keeps track of the parts of a movie or TV program that its
subscribers have paused or viewed repeatedly.70 While those highlighted
lines or repeat plays may not provide perfect proxies for the heart of the
works, they constitute powerful evidence on which parts of the works many
users have found important or interesting.
Likewise, intelligent machines can analyze well the fourth factor in the
71

This analysis will
be even better if the machines can collect additional market information that
is currently not in the possession of copyright holders, users, or technology
64 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994) ( [The third] factor calls for
thought not only about the quantity of the materials used, but about their quality and importance, too. ).
65 See LEE KAI-FU, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
142 (2018) ( Taking the next step to emotionally intelligent robots may require self-awareness, humor,
love, empathy, and appreciation for beauty. These are the key hurdles that separate what AI does today
spotting correlations in data and making predictions and artificial general intelligence. ); MCAFEE &
BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 26, at 123 ( [T]he ability to work effectively with people s emotional states
and social drives will remain a deeply human skill for some time to come. ); TOPOL, supra note 17, at
290 ( [H]uman empathy is not something machines can truly simulate, despite ongoing efforts to design
sociable robots or apps that promote empathy. ); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial
Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1269 71 (1992) (discussing the lack of capacity in artificial
intelligence for feelings).
66 See Burk, supra note 9, at 292 (noting the difficulty in programing an automated fair use system
to determine . . . whether an excerpt from the work is so significant as to constitute the heart of an
author s creation ).
67 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 600 (analyzing whether the defendant magazine had taken the
heart of the book ).
68 See Burk, supra note 9, at 292 ( It is far more difficult to envision how one might program a
system to determine . . . whether an excerpt from the work is so significant as to constitute the heart of
an author s creation. ).
69 See Viewing Popular Highlights on Kindles, EBOOK READER BLOG (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://blog.the-ebook-reader.com/2018/02/15/viewing-popular-highlights-on-kindles/
( Popular
Highlights show the most highlighted passages that readers have added to Kindle books. . . . Amazon also
displays how many times each passage has been highlighted. ).
70 See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Second Digital Disruption: Streaming and
the Dawn of Data-Driven Creativity, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1555, 1587 (2019) ( Some parameters that Netflix
tracks include, but are likely not limited to, pause/rewind/fast-forward behavior; day of the week; date of
viewing; time of viewing; zip code; preferred devices; completion rate; user ratings; user search behavior;
and browsing and scrolling behavior. ).
71 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
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platforms. Using big data analysis, algorithms can analyze the collected
information to predict
markets of the copyrighted work. Such collection and analysis will overcome
the widely noted problem of having insufficient information about the
circumstances surrounding the specific use of a copyrighted work.72 To be
sure, intelligent machines may not be able to make better predictions than
trained economists or valuation experts.73 Nevertheless, they will be able to
draw conclusions more quickly than humans, and will thereby facilitate realtime market analysis that will be both costly and time-consuming when
conducted manually. Moreover, artificial intelligence has already been
widely deployed in the financial area to provide predictive analysis.74 Such
analysis will only improve with technological improvements.
Finally, if deep learning, or the use of neural networks, is involved,75 the
comparison between automated and human performance will become even
72 See Felten, supra note 7, at 58 (identifying the [l]ack of knowledge about the circumstances
of the use as one of the two key reasons why fair use cannot be built into digital rights management
systems). As Professor Elkin-Koren explained:
[One] concern [regarding the limitations of algorithmic fair use] is that algorithms that analyze fair
use will fail to process information that is external to the content itself. For instance, determining
the nature of use may require external information and additional analysis of facts. Yet, algorithms
could be programmed to extract and analyze data from external sources. For instance, educational
use might be determined based on tagging the nature of the user. A program could detect the type of
user (e.g., educational institution, governmental agency) based on the domain name (e.g., .edu, .gov)
or by checking registration in external databases. Another indication for the nature of use could be
the type of tagging selected by the party that uploads the work (educational, commercial,
personal/private use). The commercial nature of use might actually be determined by the presence
of advertisements, or other means of monetizing the content. External information might also be
used to determine the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work, using
the commercial nature of use as a proxy.
Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1095 96.
73 See Felten, supra note 7, at 58 ( [T]he fourth factor in the [fair use] test evaluates the effect of
the use on the market for the original work. It requires reasoning about the economics of a particular
market, a task even well-trained humans find difficult. ).
74 The literature emergent in this area is vast and fast-growing. See, e.g., William Magnuson,
Artificial Financial Intelligence, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing the dangers and
real-world limitations of deploying artificial intelligence in finance).
75 As a government report on artificial intelligence explained:

Deep learning uses structures loosely inspired by the human brain, consisting of a set of units (or
neurons ). Each unit combines a set of input values to produce an output value, which in turn is
passed on to other neurons downstream. For example, in an image recognition application, a first
layer of units might combine the raw data of the image to recognize simple patterns in the image; a
second layer of units might combine the results of the first layer to recognize patterns-of-patterns; a
third layer might combine the results of the second layer; and so on.
NAT L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 9 (2016). For
discussions of deep learning, see generally ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI 104
09 (2016); KELLEHER, supra note 15; JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 121 30
(2018); THIERRY POIBEAU, MACHINE TRANSLATION 181 95 (2017).
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more complicated because automated fair use determinations may not
analyze the individual factors the same way a judge or a copyright lawyer
would.76 As Dan Burk observed:
One can imagine that a neural network or other machine
learning system could detect these or other patterns in the
data surrounding past cases, matching them to similar
patterns in the data surrounding future fair use incidents,
situations, and scenarios without formal programming
definition of the fair use factors.77
While one could argue that a proper fair use analysis must be conducted the
same way as how judges would, one cannot help but wonder whether society
would find it acceptable to have automated fair use determinations that
generate outcomes that have high correlations to the outcomes of judge-made
decisions.78
D.

Scalability

The fourth major argument supporting greater algorithmic deployment
to promote fair use regards the scalability of automated fair use systems.79 As
Charles Clark noted in a book chapter that has been widely cited for its title,
80
With the creation and

76 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1099 ( AI and machine learning would make it difficult for
courts to check the rules embedded in the system, since these systems may not explicitly demonstrate the
legal specifications of the four factors of fair use. ).
77 Burk, supra note 9, at 293.
78 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1099 (noting that, with the growing use of artificial
intelligence and machine learning, courts may have to determin[e] acceptable error rates when testing
the outcome of such a system compared to determination by the court ).
79 See AJAY AGRAWAL ET AL., PREDICTION MACHINES: THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 67 (2018) ( One major benefit of prediction machines is that they can scale in a way that
humans cannot. ); TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT
MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 97 (2018) ( Artificial
intelligence techniques offer . . . to solve the problem of scale. ); Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat
the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2019)
( Compared with the legal system, software has enormous advantages of scale and efficacy of
enforcement. It might tirelessly handle billions if not trillions of decisions in the time it takes a human
court to decide a single case. ).
80 Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine Is in the Machine, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN
A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 139 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996) (capitalization omitted). William Patry
pointed out the title of Clark s chapter is largely misnamed because that chapter concluded that the
answer to the machine may turn out to be not only in the machine, but the machine will certainly be an
important part of the answer. WILLIAM F. PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 236 41 (2011).
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dissemination of hundreds of exabytes of data and digital content every day,81
it is almost impossible for technology platforms to not rely on algorithms to
determine whether a specific use of a copyrighted work has complied with
copyright law.82 The need for such reliance is indeed why YouTube has
deployed the Content ID system to facilitate online copyright enforcement.83
Fortunately, the greater deployment of algorithms to promote fair use may
help address such an ever-growing deluge of content. As Professor ElkinKoren observed:
Algorithmic fair use could offer a workable solution for a
growing number of circumstances that involve a large
volume of content in which the costs of determining fair use
on a case-by-case basis, and the risk of mistakenly
determining fair use, are simply too high. That is the case,
for instance, in educational institutions which make large
quantities of teaching materials available for educational
purposes using e-reserve systems.84
To be sure, a time gap will always exist between the latest judicial
decision and the legal rules and outcomes that programmers manage to
encode in the algorithms.85 Nevertheless, if automated fair use systems are
constantly upgraded, the time lag between the two may be much more
acceptable and less problematic.86 Moreover, those human actors who
81 See Jeff Desjardins, How Much Data Is Generated Each Day?, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 17,
2019),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-much-data-is-generated-each-day-cf4bddf29f/
( By 2025, it s estimated that 463 exabytes of data will be created each day globally that s the equivalent
of 212,765,957 DVDs per day! ); see also Sag, supra note 21, at 513 ( In 2016, YouTube users were
uploading 400 hours of video content every minute . . . ).
82 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1098 ( The need to address the sheer volume of copyright
disputes requires a new approach to fair use that involves rethinking the role of legal oversight in
algorithmic adjudication. ); Sag, supra note 21, at 554 ( With over 400 hours of video being uploaded to
YouTube every minute, it is hard to imagine that either rightsholders, or the platform itself, could
meaningfully prevent the evisceration of online copyright without relying on automation to some extent. ).
83 See supra Part III.B (discussing the YouTube s Content ID system).
84 Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1100.
85 See Burk, supra note 9, at 298 ( [O]ne concern that could stem from the dynamic legal nature
of fair use is whether automated instantiation of fair use freezes the standard as of the time it was encoded,
so that the law and the algorithm diverge. ).
86 See id. ( The algorithm could of course be updated to learn or incorporate shifts in the legal
standard. ); Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1097 ( Machine learning capabilities could ensure that the
system is up to date because the classifications applied by the algorithm are constantly refined based on
new fair use rulings. ). This constant upgrade could be compared to the frequent and virtually
instantaneous updates found in the thirteen legacy root zone servers containing information about Internet
domain names:
As a past legacy, the database in the A Root Server, which the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ( ICANN ) currently controls by virtue of its contract with the U.S.
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constantly have to make fair use determinations, such as Internet users and
copyright enforcement personnel, do not always keep track of all the latest
fair use decisions. If machines can learn those decisions more quickly than
the relevant human actors such as judges, lawyers, and law enforcement
personnel automated fair use systems can still be highly appealing. After
all, the limited number of fair use cases suggest that most fair use
determinations are made outside the courtroom.87
E.

Low-Cost Determinations

The fifth major argument supporting greater algorithmic deployment to
promote fair use involves the ability of automated fair use systems to provide
low-cost determinations to a large number of people who otherwise may not
be able to afford copyright lawyers.88 As Lawrence Lessig put it memorably,
89

With automation, the greater deployment of algorithms will
help those users who cannot afford to hire lawyers, or hire them frequently,
to explore the boundaries of the law or to provide the support needed to test
those boundaries.90 If automated fair use determinations can have legal
effects even if only on an interim basis those determinations can enlarge
the creative spaces of risk-averse users, some of whom may fear that their
creative endeavors will violate current copyright law.91
Although automated fair use systems can help users, those systems can
also harm users if the algorithms involved fail to capture the full range of
limitations and exceptions in copyright law. Indeed, when Dan Burk and Julie
Cohen analyzed this topic about two decades ago, one of their key concerns
was that automated systems would end up encouraging minimalist

Department of Commerce . . . , is considered authoritative. The other root servers merely copy this
root zone file to their servers.
Peter K. Yu, The Origins of ccTLD Policymaking, 12 CARDOZO J. INT L & COMP. L. 387, 390 (2004).
87 See Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 57 58 ( Judicial determinations and negotiated minimum
standards are not the only possible measures of current fair use practice; arguably, the more accurate
measure of fair use is the daily behavior of ordinary users. ).
88 Thanks to Hannibal Travis for pushing me on this point.
89 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004).
90 See Burk, supra note 9, at 289 ( Automated identification and removal, whether accurate or
mistaken, is relatively cheap, whereas legal and institutional engagement is comparatively expensive. ).
91 See id. at 288 ( Risk averse content users, unable to confidently predict the ultimate decision
on their activities, may forgo some socially beneficial uses. ); Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1100 ( The
high cost and high risk involved in fair use implementation prevents users from taking advantage of
productive uses that can foster copyright goals, simply because they fear liability. ).
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interpretations of important safeguards and the establishment of ceilings for
these safeguards.92 As they observed:
We are . . . skeptical . . . about the ability of negotiated
[technical] defaults to capture the full range of social benefit
that more flexible legal standards allow. While these defaults
sometimes might allow access that would exceed fair use
more likely to tend toward a minimalist view of fair use. We
suspect that copyright holders would be willing to concede
fair use in only a small fraction of the situations that would
constitute fair use indeed, it was just such insistence upon
minimalist guidelines by rights holders that led to the
collapse of the [Conference on Fair Use] discussions.
for educational copying, rights holders, content users, and
even courts have shown a deplorable tendency to act as
though the guidelines defined the outer limits of fair use. To
the contrary, such guidelines were intended to delineate fair
use minima: a floor rather than a ceiling. We are
consequently reluctant to recommend an infrastructure
based solely on the design of similar defaults into selfeffect could be even more pernicious.93
Thus, whether algorithmic deployment can benefit users will depend on
whether the algorithms involved have been properly designed.
In sum, like the existence of arguments asserting why algorithms cannot
be satisfactorily deployed to promote fair use, there are also many arguments
supporting such deployment. Whether algorithms should be deployed to a
greater extent may ultimately depend on a cost-benefit analysis that weighs
the strengths of automated fair use systems against their weaknesses. Such
analysis will likely vary, depending on whether the analysis is conducted
from the perspective of the copyright holder, the user, the technology
platform, or another stakeholder in the copyright system.

92 Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 57; see also Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1096 ( The main
concern is that reducing the four-factor analysis into a simplistic and somewhat rigid set of algorithmic
instructions might cause some important aspects of fair use analysis to get lost along the way. ).
93 Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 57.
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ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

Given the existence of these strengths, policymakers and commentators
will need to pay increased attention to ways that could help develop an
environment to support the greater deployment of automated fair use
systems.94 Such increased attention is important for at least three reasons.
First, the copyright industries and technology platforms may choose to make
greater algorithmic deployment even when they are well aware of the many
documented weaknesses of automated copyright enforcement.95 They would
do so either because they disagree with the skeptics or because they see the
benefits of automation outweighing its costs. Second, the more supportive
this environment is, the greater the benefits of such deployment will become.
Such growing support would therefore not only tip the balance of the costbenefit analysis toward greater automation but would also provide an
promote fair use in copyright law.96 Third, preparation is well advised
because changes in this area are likely to be fast and sudden, similar to how
quickly digital technology disrupted the business models of brick-and-mortar
companies two decades ago.97 While Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee
98

Lee

94 For those policymakers and commentators who find greater automation undesirable, the
establishment of this supporting environment would make thing worse. Nevertheless, this Article takes
the view that greater automation is not only beneficial but also inevitable. Even if fair use is not automated
to a greater extent, copyright enforcement will be. If we are to retain, or restore, the balance of the
copyright system, greater algorithmic deployment will be highly sensible.
95

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Cf. Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 213 16 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007) (discussing the
importance of an enabling environment for effective intellectual property protection); Peter K. Yu,
Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239, 265 68 (2012) (criticizing the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement for its failure to create the enabling environment needed to foster
effective enforcement of intellectual property rights).
97 Napster is frequently noted for its disruption to the music industry s traditional business model.
See generally Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (discussing the disruption caused by
Napster and other digital distribution technologies and the creative destruction of copyright). For booklength treatments documenting the adverse impact of digital distribution on the music industry, see
generally GREG KOT, RIPPED: HOW THE WIRED GENERATION REVOLUTIONIZED MUSIC (2009); ROBERT
LEVINE, FREE RIDE: HOW DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE CULTURE BUSINESS, AND HOW THE
CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK (2011).
98 ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS,
AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 20 (2014). As the authors observed: Progress
on some of the oldest and toughest challenges associated with computers, robots, and other digital gear
96
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99

To create an environment that will support and enable the greater
deployment of algorithms to promote fair use in copyright law, policymakers
and commentators should focus attention on two distinct types of needs: the
need for preparation for change and the need for support. This Part discusses
each need in turn. With respect to the latter, it further offers suggestions on
what complementary measures policymakers should introduce.
A.

Need for Preparation for Change
1.

Legal Practices

The first set of changes for which policymakers and commentators will
have to prepare relates to legal practices or, to be more precise, fair use
practices. The current fair use system is based on precision found in ex post
decisions. If a user wants to find out whether copyright law permits his or her
use of a copyrighted work, that user will have to go to a court. Should the
highest court in the country, such as the United States Supreme Court, decide
that the use is fair, the legal inquiry will end. Although policymakers,
commentators, and industry representatives have criticized fair use decisions
for being unclear and unpredictable,100 the case-by-case analysis provided by
courts does indicate, with sufficient clarity and predictability, whether
copyright law permits a specific use.
When fair use determinations are made by algorithms, however,
precision will have to give way to high probability101 a trade-off that would
was gradual for a long time. Then in the past few years it became sudden; digital gear started racing ahead,
accomplishing tasks it had always been lousy at and displaying skills it was not supposed to acquire
anytime soon. Id.
99 LEE, supra note 65, at 152.
100 As the Australian Law Reform Commission observed:
The opponents of fair use have pointed to research indicating that the outcome of fair use cases is
unpredictable. The outcome of litigation is never completely predictable if it were, the parties
would not have commenced litigation, or would likely have settled. This is also true of recent
litigation over the fair dealing exceptions and specific exceptions.
AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM N, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: FINAL REPORT 115 (2013).
But see Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2542 & n.28 (2009) ( If
one analyzes putative fair uses in light of cases previously decided in the same policy cluster, it is generally
possible to predict whether a use is likely to be fair or unfair. The only clusters of fair use cases in which
it is quite difficult to predict whether uses are likely to be fair is in the educational and research use clusters
where judges have tended to take starkly different perspectives on fair use defenses in these settings . . . ).
101 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1099 ( AI systems do not decide fair use, but simply
generate a score that reflects the probability of fair use. ); see also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER &
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make many lawyers uncomfortable. As noted earlier, the current state of
102
As a result,
algorithms are incapable of making precise determinations of what the law
would or would not permit, unless the use in question is identical, or virtually
identical, to the use in a previously adjudicated case. Notwithstanding this
shortcoming, algorithms may be able to determine, with high probability,
whether the law would permit such a use. Such a determination will become
even more accurate as automated fair use systems take better advantage of
big data analysis and machine learning capabilities.
To the extent that policymakers and commentators are comfortable with
the change in fair use practices from precision to high probability, the
deployment of algorithms to promote fair use will receive wider acceptance.
By contrast, if they remain uncomfortable with this change, they will likely
discourage greater algorithmic deployment. Thus far, there has been little
research on whether precision-based fair use analysis will better promote
creativity than fair use analysis that has attained high probability.103
Moreover, the limited number of adjudicated fair use cases suggests that most
fair use determinations found in the creative environment are made ex ante
outside the courtroom.104 These decisions are therefore based more on
probability than on precision. If so, the development of automated fair use
systems that attain high probability may be more appealing than it sounds.
2.

Creative Practices

The second set of changes for which policymakers and commentators
will have to prepare pertains to creative practices. As Part II.B has noted, the
greater deployment of fair use algorithms may cause users to change their
creative choices and practices. Such behavioral changes have indeed been a
key concern of Professor Burk in his latest article on algorithmic fair use.105
enforcement algorithms threatens to degrade the exception into an
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND
THINK 32 72 (2013) (discussing the trade-offs between exactitude and messiness and between causality
and correlation).
102 See discussion supra Part II.A.
103 The closest research in this area concerns the differences between court decisions and ordinary
fair use practices. See, e.g., ASS N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY
FILMMAKERS
STATEMENT
OF
BEST
PRACTICES
IN
FAIR
USE
(2005),
http://archive.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/fair_use_final.pdf (stating the best practices in fair use for
documentary filmmakers).
104
105

See discussion supra Part III.D.
Burk, supra note 9.
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unrecognizable form. Worse yet, social internalization of a bowdlerized
version of fair use deployed in algorithmic format is likely to become the new
106

we have seen creative practices changing in response to new laws or judicial
decisions, such as in the area of appropriation art107 and digital sampling.108
While one could certainly debate whether those changes promote or hurt
creativity, changes to creative practices are inevitable whenever legal
decisions are made whether by humans or machines. The key question
about automated fair use systems is therefore not whether these systems will
make decisions, but whether they will make worse decisions, or make worse
decisions more frequently.
Moreover, the ever-growing utilization of algorithm-driven copyright
enforcement in technology platforms suggests that creative choices and
practices will change regardless of whether automated fair use systems are
deployed or not. In fact, such deployment may help offset the excesses found
in automated copyright enforcement, thereby providing a better balance to
the copyright system and instilling a sense of fairness that induces lawabiding behavior.109 As Professor Elkin-Koren noted emphatically in her
Nimmer Memorial Le
era of algorithmic governance. The need to develop such tools is necessary
in order to tilt the copyright balance back to its origin in our robo notice
110
]t may seem desirable to
incorporate context-specific fair use metrics into copyright-policing
algorithms, both to protect against automated overdeterrence and to inform
111

106

Id. at 306.
For discussions of appropriation art, see generally Richard H. Chused, The Legal Culture of
Appropriation Art: The Future of Copyright in the Remix Age, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 163
(2014); Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in Authorial Control over
Copyrighted Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC Y U.S.A. 93 (1994); William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed
Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2000); Niels
Schaumann, Fair Use and Appropriation Art, 6 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 112 (2015); David Tan,
The Transformative Use Doctrine and Fair Dealing in Singapore: Understanding the Purpose and
Character of Appropriation Art, 24 SING. ACAD. L.J. 832 (2012).
108 For discussions of digital sampling, see generally JOANNA TERESA DEMERS, STEAL THIS
MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AFFECTS MUSICAL CREATIVITY 71 110 (2006); KEMBREW
MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011).
109 See Armstrong, supra note 4, at 109 ( Empowering users to exercise their fair use rights
without violating the DMCA might . . . increase law-abiding behavior and temper the critical evaluation
of the DMCA as a one-sided giveaway to powerful producer cartels. (footnote omitted)).
107

110
111

Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1100.
Burk, supra note 9, at 284 85.
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Finally, although the use of automated fair use systems will likely affect,
or even curtail, select creative practices, one would expect new creative
practices to be developed in response to the greater deployment of these
systems. Whether those new practices will be better or worse from a creative
standpoint is difficult to judge. Moreover, social practices, including creative
practices, are constantly defined and redefined through their interactions with
technology, and vice versa. Just as automated fair use systems will shape
creative practices, the changing creative practices will also shape those
systems.112 In the age of artificial intelligence, in which machines are
constantly learning and improving, there is a good chance that the
development of new creative practices and the availability of more
information for big data analysis would lead to modifications that would
allow algorithms to better promote creativity.
B.

Need for Support
1.

Judicial Support

Apart from the increased preparedness for the two sets of changes
mentioned above, policymakers will need to introduce complementary
measures to support automated fair use systems if these systems are to be
developed. The first type of measures concern judicial support. Even with the
greater use of automated systems, courts will remain highly important. As

112

Tarleton Gillespie noted the entanglement between algorithms and social practices:

[W]e must consider not [the algorithms ] effect on people, but a multidimensional entanglement
between algorithms put into practice and the social tactics of users who take them up. This
relationship is, of course, a moving target, because algorithms change, and the user populations and
activities they encounter change as well. Still, this should not imply that there is no relationship. As
these algorithms nestle into people s daily lives and mundane information practices, users shape and
rearticulate the algorithms they encounter; and algorithms impinge on how people seek information,
how they perceive and think about the contours of knowledge, and how they understand themselves
in and through public discourse.
It is important that we conceive of this entanglement not as a one-directional influence, but as a
recursive loop between the calculations of the algorithm and the calculations of people. The
algorithm that helps users navigate Flickr s photo archive is built on the archive of photos posted,
which means it is designed to apprehend and reflect back the choices made by photographers. What
people do and do not photograph is already a kind of calculation, though one that is historical,
multivalent, contingent, and sociologically informed. But these were not Flickr s only design
impulses; sensitivity to photographic practices had to compete with cost, technical efficiency, legal
obligation, and business imperatives. And the population of Flickr users and the types of photos they
post changed as the site grew in popularity, was forced to compete with Facebook, introduced tiered
pricing, was bought by Yahoo, and so forth.
Gillespie, supra note 24, at 183.
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In a proposal advanced more than a decade ago, I also

courts (and human actors) to intervene when needed.114 Although automation
enhances efficiency and effectiveness, human intervention can be highly
beneficial. To some extent, the debate about the need for such intervention
ties to the ongoing debate about whether machines can perform as well as
lawyers or judges.115
Should we end up choosing to develop automated fair use systems that
include judicial intervention at the end of the process, the determinations
made by these systems should be viewed as interim, rather than final.116 In
effect, such systems will provide technically driven safe harbors for users
until courts step in to make adjustments. Given the potential, and likely
constant, modification of these safe harbors, one inevitably will wonder what
would happen should a court find out months, or years, later that an earlier
automated fair use determination was incorrect.117
While it is impossible to go back in time, automated fair use systems
can be utilized to facilitate compensation. Consider, for example, a system
that has been built into a technology platform that disseminates uploaded
113 Burk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 75; see also Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in
Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 551 (2005) ( [T]echnological
controls tend to be relatively blunt instruments for control of digital content, unable to accommodate
copyright fair use without the re-introduction of human discretion. ).
114 See Yu, supra note 4, at 73 ( [A] two-step approach technology first, then courts seems to
be the best compromise we can have today, and it is worth considering developing such a system as we
explore the next generation of [digital rights management] systems. ). Niva Elkin-Koren outlined a similar
approach: Algorithmic fair use could . . . involve a two-tier review. First, algorithmic screening would
be performed and second, for cases which were flagged by the system, but were inconclusive, human
review would be conducted. Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1098.
115 For discussions in this area, see generally Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot:
Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017); Crootof, supra
note 56; Milan Markovic, Rise of the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325 (2019); Andrew C. Michaels,
Artificial Intelligence, Legal Change, and Separation of Powers, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083 (2020); Frank
Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1
(2019); Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 242 (2019); Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers: Computers, Lawyers,
and the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501 (2017); Harry Surden, Machine Learning and
Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87 (2014); Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135 (2019); Wu,
supra note 79. For earlier discussions in this area (collected in Professor Volokh s article), see generally
Bruce G. Buchanan & Thomas E. Headrick, Some Speculation About Artificial Intelligence and Legal
Reasoning, 23 STAN. L. REV. 40 (1970); Anthony D Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, 11
GA. L. REV. 1277 (1977); L. Thorne McCarty, Reflections on Taxman : An Experiment in Artificial
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1977).
116 See Burk, supra note 9, at 297 ( Patterns detected by a machine evaluating fair use-related data
should not be confused with a legal institutional determination of fair use. ).
117 Thanks to Martin Senftleben for asking this important question.
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tent ID system. That system could be
easily designed to allow for dissemination if the probability of fair use is over
seventy-five percent but prohibit such dissemination if the probability falls
below fifty percent. For probability that is in between, the system could
further require the revenue stream to be put in escrow for a certain period of
time say, six months or a year.
Should infringement be found later, the court could require the user to
reverse the revenue stream based on what the system has documented
including, where applicable, that the technology platform releases the
revenue in escrow to the copyright holder. The court could also grant
injunctive relief, as the law currently allows.118 Should the copyright holder
prefer injunctive relief over compensation, he or she could file a complaint
in court as soon as the alleged infringement has been discovered. Should the
copyright holder choose to tolerate such infringement, he or she would still
have the option to seek compensation and injunctive relief later, as long as
the statute of limitations had not been tolled.119
Obviously, the automated fair use system proposed here could be
calibrated very differently, depending on legislative or policy preferences.
For instance, the seventy-five percent threshold could be easily adjusted
upward to eighty or ninety percent or downward to 66.7 percent. Such an
adjustment will affect the creative space available to users. In addition, even
though the proposal anticipates that only courts will grant injunctive relief,
that type of relief could be easily built into the system, similar to how
specific copyrighted work. The key takeaway of this proposal is not its fine
details, but that algorithms can be carefully designed and tailored to
accommodate a wide variety of preferences and situations. We should not
have a simplistic assumption that automated fair use systems can, or will,
make only binary determinations for example, whether the use is fair or
not.
2.

Technological Support

The second type of complementary measures relates to technological
support. If automated fair use systems are to be developed, the algorithms
involved have to be trusted by the different stakeholders in the copyright
system.120 As a result, impartiality has to be built into the algorithms from the
118
119

See

8) (providing injunction as a remedy for copyright infringement).

See 17 U.S.C.
No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title
unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued. ).
120 As a National Research Council study reminded us:
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very beginning. To do so, it would be important to set up a neutral and
representative body that would supervise the development of fair use
algorithms.121 These algorithms could not be designed solely by the copyright
industries that want to maximize enforcement, those technology platforms
that seek to avoid copyright lawsuits and legal liability, or a combination of
these two groups of players.122
Considering the likely existence of a wide variety of algorithms that
could make automated fair use determinations,123 a process can be further
developed to facilitate the certification of different algorithms that are equally
capable of making high-quality decisions. Having such a process is desirable
because it will facilitate competition over algorithmic quality.124 Should there
The debate over intellectual property includes almost everyone, from authors and publishers, to
consumers (e.g., the reading, listening, and viewing public), to libraries and educational institutions,
to governmental and standards bodies. Each of the stakeholders has a variety of concerns . . . that
are at times aligned with those of other stakeholders, and at other times opposed. An individual
stakeholder may also play multiple roles with various concerns. At different times, a single
individual may be an author, reader, consumer, teacher, or shareholder in publishing or
entertainment companies; a member of an editorial board; or an officer of a scholarly society that
relies on publishing for revenue. The dominant concern will depend on the part played at the
moment.
COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS & THE EMERGING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT L RES. COUNCIL, THE
DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 51 (2000); see also Mark Stefik,
Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital
Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137, 156 (1997) (identifying among the stakeholders relevant to a
proposed Digital Property Trust publishers, trusted system vendors, financial institutions, lawmakers,
librarians, and consumers ); Yu, supra note 4, at 31 (noting that stakeholders in the copyright debate, and
the debate on digital rights management systems in particular, cannot be nicely divided into binaries).
121 See Yu, supra note 4, at 68 ( [W]e need to develop a process that brings together copyright
holders, technology developers, consumer advocates, civil libertarians and other stakeholders. ); see also
COHEN, supra note 7, at 192 ( Mastering the processes by which technical standards are developed . . .
requires . . . new public accountability mechanisms. ).
122 See Armstrong, supra note 4, at 121 ( The more technology reflects only one set of interests,
. . . the more it departs from the law, which conceptualizes copyright as a balancing of interests, with the
ultimate goal of fostering both creative expression and broad public availability of creative works. ); see
also Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 682 (2017) ( A prejudiced
decisionmaker could skew the training data or pick proxies for protected classes with the intent of
generating discriminatory results. ).
123 See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 79, at 189 ( There is often no single right answer to the
question of which is the best AI strategy or the best set of AI tools, because AIs involve trade-offs: more
speed, less accuracy; more autonomy, less control; more data, less privacy. ).
124 As I noted in a recent article:

Competition is imperative if society is to develop more efficient, more effective, and less biased
algorithms. Such competition is particularly needed when algorithmic choices are increasingly
difficult, or time consuming, to explain. Indeed, without competition, it would be hard to identify
problems within an algorithm or to determine whether that algorithm has provided the best solution
in light of the existing technological conditions and constraints.
Yu, supra note 26 (footnotes omitted); see also Peter K. Yu, Data Producer s Right and the Protection of
Machine-Generated Data, 93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 927 (2019) (noting that competition law is a critical area
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oach will allow courts, or the certification body, to step in.
Although it would be ideal to eliminate all disagreements, for the sake of
clarity and predictability, the preference for competition presumes the
existence of disagreements and diversity. Moreover, disagreements over fair
use interpretations are not uncommon within our current copyright system.
In the U.S. federal system, courts at both the horizontal and vertical levels do
not always agree on their interpretations of copyright law.125
Once developed, automated fair use systems will have to be constantly
audited to ensure that the systems remain neutral and the outcomes consistent
with existing copyright law.126 Such constant auditing reflects the best
practices advocated by the technology community. Principle 7 of the ACM
Statement on Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability declared:
document those methods and results. In particular, they should routinely
perform tests to assess and determine whether the model generates
127
The FAT/ML Principles for Accountable
Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for Algorithms also called for
t

relating to data governance ); Annie Lee, Note, Algorithmic Auditing and Competition Under the CFAA:
The Revocation Paradigm of Interpreting Access and Authorization, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1307, 1310
(2018) ( Online competitors . . . promote fair online practices by providing users with a choice between
competitive products . . . ).
125 On disagreements at the horizontal level, compare Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d
1232, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that th[e] reasoning is somewhat circular when the failure to pay a
potential licensing fee is used to disprove fair use), with Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d
913, 930 31 (2d Cir. 1994) ( [I]t is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular
use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means for paying for such
a use is made easier. ). On disagreements at the vertical level, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), rev d, 545
U.S. 913 (2005).
126 As the Center for Democracy and Technology noted:
Audits are one method to provide explanations and redress without compromising the intellectual
property behind the business model. Designing algorithmic systems that can be easily audited
increases accountability and provides a framework to standardize best practices across industries.
While explanations can help individuals understand algorithmic decision making, audits are
necessary for systemic and long-term detection of unfair outcomes. They also make it possible to fix
problems when they arise.
Digital Decisions, supra note 32, at 11. But see Kroll et al., supra note 122, at 660 61 (discussing the
limits to auditing in the algorithmic context).
127 ACM Statement, supra note 3.
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128

As Lorna McGregor,

During the design and development stage, impact
assessments should evaluate how an algorithm is likely to
work, ensure that it functions as intended and identify any
problematic processes or assumptions. This provides an
opportunity to modify the design of an algorithm at an early
stage, to build in . . . compliance including monitoring
mechanisms from the outset, or to halt development if . . .
concerns cannot be addressed. Impact assessments should
also be conducted at the deployment stage, in order to
monitor effects during operation. . . . [T]his requires that,
during design and development, the focus should not only be
on testing but steps should also be taken to build in effective
oversight and monitoring processes that will be able to
identify and respond to [problems] once the algorithm is
deployed.129
While algorithmic audits have attracted the attention of many
commentators, training data increasingly drive the performance of
algorithms. As a result, these audits have to cover not only the algorithms
themselves but also training data and algorithmic outcomes.130 When
learning algorithms are involved, scrutinizing algorithms alone will unlikely
reveal the full extent of any problems that the automated fair use systems
may encounter. To the extent privacy concerns are raised when algorithmic
outcomes are being disclosed for auditing purposes, the audits could focus
instead on representative, anonymized samples of different algorithmic
128 Principles for Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for Algorithms,
FAT/ML, https://www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms (last visited July 9,
2019). FAT/ML stands for Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning. Id.
129 Lorna McGregor et al., International Human Rights Law as a Framework for Algorithmic
Accountability, 68 INT L & COMP. L.Q. 309, 330 (2019).
130 See O NEIL, supra note 35, at 229 ( We have to learn to interrogate our data collection process,
not just our algorithms. ); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1024 25
(2017) ( What we need instead is a transparency of inputs and results, which allows us to see that the
algorithm is generating discriminatory impact. ); Kartik Hosanagar & Vivian Jair, We Need Transparency
in Algorithms, but Too Much Can Backfire, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 23, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/weneed-transparency-in-algorithms-but-too-much-can-backfire ( [M]achine learning algorithms and deep
learning algorithms in particular are usually built on just a few hundred lines of code. The algorithms
logic is mostly learned from training data and is rarely reflected in its source code. Which is to say, some
of today s best-performing algorithms are often the most opaque. ); Kroll et al., supra note 122, at 641
( [W]ithout full transparency including source code, input data, and the full operating environment of
the software even the disclosure of audit logs showing what a program did while it was running provides
no guarantee that the disclosed information actually reflects a computer system s behavior. ); see also id.
at 657 60 (discussing the limits to transparency in the algorithmic context).
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outcomes, or of those outcomes that were based on test data provided by
auditors or consumer advocacy groups.131
3.

Legislative Support

The final type of complementary measures pertains to legislative
support. If the successful development of automated fair use systems requires
the collection and big data analysis of additional records that are currently
not in the possession of copyright holders, users, or technology platforms, we
will need to introduce legal reforms. We will also need to do so if we are to
establish an environment that supports the auditing of automated fair use
systems.
As commentators have pointed out, the protection of intellectual
property rights has posed significant barriers to both big data analysis and
algorithmic audits. Examples range from copyright protection that prevents
the mining of text and data that can be used for fair use determinations132 to
131 See Yu, supra note 26 ( [T]echnology developers could provide a representative, anonymized
sample of the different algorithmic outcomes to enable the public to determine for itself the satisfactoriness
of algorithm-enhanced technological products and services. ).
132 As Amanda Levendowski observed:
Copyright law causes friction that limits access to training data and restricts who can use certain
data. This friction is a significant contributor to biased AI. The friction caused by copyright law
encourages AI creators to use biased, low-friction data . . . for training AI systems, like the word2vec
toolkit, despite those demonstrable biases. As Google s decision not to freely release the Google
News corpus reveals, copyright law can also curtail the implementation of bias mitigation
techniques, including interventions like reweighting algorithmic inputs or supplementing datasets
with additional data. Copyright law can even preclude potential competitors from converting the
customers of dominant AI players. . . .
Good training data is crucial for creating accurate AI systems. The AI system tasked with
identifying cats must be able [to] abstract out the right features, or heuristics, of a cat from training
data. To do so, the training data must be well-selected by humans training data infused with
implicit bias can result in skewed datasets that fuel both false positives and false negatives. For
example, a dataset that features only cats with tortoiseshell markings runs the risk that the AI system
will learn that a mélange of black, orange, and cream markings [is] a heuristic for identifying a cat
and mistakenly identify other creatures, like brindle-colored dogs, as cats. Similarly, a dataset that
features only mainstream domestic cats could create an AI system that learns that cats have fluffy
fur, pointy ears, and long tails and fail to identify cats of outlier breeds, like a Devon Rex, Scottish
Fold, or Manx. And, in both examples, all manner of wildcats are excluded from the training data.
Levendowski, supra note 31, at 589 92 (footnotes omitted); see also Lim, supra note 2, at 847 55 (noting
the need for expanding fair use to promote artificial intelligence); Benjamin L.W. Sobel, Artificial
Intelligence s Fair Use Crisis, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 45, 61 79 (2017) (identifying the potential legal
liability for copyright infringement when copyrighted works are used to train intelligent machines). While
fair use may need to be expanded to promote artificial intelligence, the non-protection of copyrighted
works generated by artificial intelligence may provide an ever-growing trove of helpful training data that
reside in the public domain. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES § 313.2 (3d ed. 2017) ( [The U.S. Copyright] Office will not register works produced by a
machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input
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trade secret protection that prevents the inspection of copyrighted algorithms
and their protected input, training, and feedback data.133 Outside the
intellectual property arena, statutes such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act134 also make it difficult for independent auditors to access algorithms. In
addition, privacy protection, such as the protection found in the EU General
Data Protection Regulation,135
abilities to access and collect personally identifying records that are needed
for fair use determinations.
Given these barriers and continuous challenges, policymakers will need
to introduce complementary legal reforms if algorithms are to be deployed to

or intervention from a human author. ); Clark D. Asay, Independent Creation in a World of AI, 14 FIU L.
REV. 201 (2020) (noting the potentially differing second factor analysis in the fair use determination of
machine-generated works). But see Grimmelmann, There s No Such Thing, supra note 2, at 403 ( [N]o
one has ever exhibited even one work that could plausibly claim to have a computer for an author in the
sense that the Copyright Act uses the term. ). For discussions of the importance of exceptions for text and
data mining to the copyright systems, see generally Christophe Geiger et al., Crafting a Text and Data
Mining Exception for Machine Learning and Big Data in the Digital Single Market, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DIGITAL TRADE IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND BIG DATA 95 (Xavier
Seuba et al. eds., 2018); Michael W. Carroll, Copyright and the Progress of Science: Why Text and Data
Mining Is Lawful, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893 (2019); Matthew Sag, The New Legal Landscape for Text
Mining and Machine Learning, 66 J. COPYRIGHT SOC Y U.S.A. 291 (2019).
133 See Burk, supra note 9, at 301 (noting the the explicit or intentional obscurity stemming from
trade secrecy and protection of confidential business information to the extent that algorithms are
commissioned or developed by commercial entities, they may attempt to shield proprietary aspects of the
technology from misappropriation or competitive copying ). For discussions of the tension between
transparency and disclosure on the one hand and trade secret protection on the other, see generally Sonia
K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1183 (2019); Rebecca Wexler,
Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1343 (2018).
134 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018). As Sonia Katyal observed:
[T]he ACLU sued on behalf of four researchers who maintained that [this statute] actually prevented
them from scraping data from sites, or from creating fake profiles to investigate whether algorithmic
discrimination led some employment and real estate sites to fail to display certain listings on the
basis of race or gender. The concern was that the law permitted researchers to be held criminally
accountable because the research might involve violating one of the sites Terms of Service,
something that could carry both prison and fines. As one researcher observed, these laws have the
perverse effect of protecting data-driven commercial systems from even the most basic external
analysis.
Katyal, supra note 32, at 122 (footnotes omitted); see also Levendowski, supra note 31, at 587 88 ( Some
courts have interpreted the [Computer Fraud and Abuse Act] as prohibiting violation of an employer s
computer-use policies or a website s Terms of Service, which can chill algorithmic accountability testing,
including digital auditing used to uncover racial discrimination. (footnote omitted)); Lee, supra note 124,
at 1311 38 (discussing how the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has discouraged algorithmic auditors
from exposing questionable business practices and has fostered a hostile market for legitimate
competitors).
135 Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 33.
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a greater extent to promote fair use in copyright law.136 Obviously, fair use is
only part of the copyright system and an even smaller part of the overall
legal system. When considering what reform to introduce, policymakers will
inevitably have to balance the different interests, preferences, and policy
objectives to determine how best to facilitate the development of automated
fair use systems.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has documented the case for and against the greater
deployment of algorithms to promote fair use in copyright law. If
policymakers are eager to develop automated fair use systems, they will need
to be prepared for changes in both legal and creative practices that will be
brought about by greater algorithmic deployment. They will also need to be
willing to introduce complementary measures to build a supportive
environment that will enable and facilitate automated fair use determinations.
Until we are ready for these changes and until that supportive environment
can be built, however, it is understandable why many policymakers and
commentators have remained skeptical of the satisfactory deployment of
algorithms to promote fair use in copyright law.

136 See Yu, supra note 26 ( To provide support for external audits that do not involve regulatory
authorities, adjustments will have to be made to those laws that have posed barriers to external reviews of
source code and computer systems, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. (footnotes omitted)).

